ATG seminar series presents
A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks
by Martin Schaefer
Time: Wednesday, July 01 at 14:30 in room KN:205.
I am going to present our recent work with M. Egan, M.Jakob and N. Oren on double auction mechanism for on-demand transport services.
Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber and Liftago in Prague. Importantly, these services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago's approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfies key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.