# News & Events

### CS seminar series - Jie Zhang

CS seminar series presents

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Game Analysis, Mechanism Design, and Applications

by Jie Zhang

Monday, May 2 at 14:30 in 205

Abstract:

We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. From the mechanism design perspective, we show that the folklore mechanism Random Priority is asymptotically the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the best ordinal mechanism for the problem. From the game analysis perspective, we present a general lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms and we show that the  Probabilistic Serial protocol achieves a matching upper bound. We discuss some applications and extensions of the problem.