Joint work with János Flesch, Mathias Staudigl and Dries Vermeulen
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid–process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either to stop or to continue. The receiver, only seeing the message but not the state, decides either to stop the game, or to continue which takes the game to the next period. The payoff to each player is a function of the state when the receiver quits, with higher states leading to better payoffs. The horizon of the game can be finite or infinite. We characterize the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of these games when the players are sufficiently patient; the payoffs are either undiscounted or discounted with a large discount factor. We also derive existence and uniqueness results for PBE. As we show, in all our results the central role is played by a specific strategy profile in which the sender uses a threshold strategy whereas the receiver blindly follows the recommendations of the sender. This implies that in PBE the sender plays the decisive role, and surprisingly, regardless of the payoff function of the receiver, the sender obtains the best possible payoff for himself. We also consider the extension in which there are multiple senders and just one receiver.
July 9 (Thursday), 14:30
This is an internal seminar for members of the Department of Computer Science only. Ask at email@example.com for the Zoom link.
Aditya is a final year PhD candidate in game theory at the Quantitative Economics department, Maastricht University. He is fortunate to be advised by Dries Vermeulen, János Flesch and Mathias Staudigl. Before coming in Maastricht, he completed his BSc (Honours) in Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science and MSc in Theoretical Computer Science at Chennai Mathematical Institute. He is interested in studying strategic interaction between the partially informed agents in dynamic settings and the underlying information and learning structures. He is interested in the computation of the equilibria in such settings. His other interests include social choice theory and mechanism design.